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Rosh and Rand: Tribute

A PORTRAIT OF AN ARTIST AS A WISE MAN:
JUDGE ALTIMARI'S JURISPRUDENCE
Robert M. Rosh* and Joseph R. Rand**

Almost all law clerks begin their clerkships with the hope that
they will have a profound influence on the thinking of their
judges, only to ultimately find that they are the ones more
changed from the experience.

Judge Altimari's law clerks were

no exception. As we ponder the effect that Judge Altimari had on
our lives and on our view of the law and its purposes, we come
away with the realization that Judge Altimari not only embraced
us as a part of his family, 1 he invited his clerks to drink of his
world view, and in so doing indelibly etched his jurisprudence

into our psyches. This article seeks to convey some of the
wisdom that he tried to impart to its authors by analyzing some of
the more influential opinions2 written by Judge Altimari and
* Robert M. Rosh, a law clerk to Judge Altimari from 1991-1993, is an
Assistant General Counsel at New York Life Insurance Company and an
Adjunct Professor of Insurance Law at the Jacob D. Fuchsberg Law Center,
the Benjamin Cardozo School of Law, and New York Law School. The views
expressed herein are solely those of the author.
** Joseph W. Rand, a law clerk to Judge Altimari from 1992-1994, is an
Instructor of Law at Brooklyn Law School (J.S.M. Stanford Law School (in
progress); J.D. Georgetown University Law Center, 1989). The views
expressed herein are solely those of the author.
Judge Altimari was loved and revered by his law clerks, and we were no
exception. It was our privilege to serve as his clerks. We were all profoundly
influenced by him in both our professional and personal lives, and he was a
father figure to all of us. Like all of his clerks, we grew in stature
immediately upon our departure from his service. Similarly, while we were
clerks, we were regaled with stories by the Judge of the brilliance of our
predecessors. At a party thrown for Judge Altimari by his law clerks to
celebrate his tenth anniversary on the federal bench, the Judge remarked that
he loved us all the same, but for different reasons. While we mourn his loss,
we celebrate his life and accomplishments.
2 A number of decisions written by Judge Altimari have had a profound
effect on our society. Indeed, as Alexis de Tocqueville observed, in the
United States federal judges "almost always acting alone" decide the most
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placing them within the framework of his philosophy of the law;
it is not intended to be an exhaustive and critical analysis of his
hundreds of authored opinions.
Judge Altimari's jurisprudence is in some ways difficult to
categorize.

Late in life, he discovered and developed a

prodigious talent for sculpting, 3 and like any sculptor he
employed different tools as the need arose.4 Similarly, he viewed
the law pragmatically, and did not feel compelled to use a

hammer when another tool was more appropriate. 5 Nevertheless,
like any artist, he viewed the canvas, a piece of marble, or the
law through a prism of life experience and learning.

Judge Altimari's world view was shaped by his deep religious
faith and his long-standing relationship with the Catholic Church,
his love and devotion to his family, and his love of learning. It is

clear that his faith and his love of learning led him to the
teachings of St. Thomas Aquinas. Similarly, his traditional "old
important issues involving the nature and limits of governmental power,
including conflicts over rights. ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN
AMERICA 276 n.7 (J.P. Mayer ed. & George Lawrence trans., 1969). Judge
Altimari's concurrence with this view can be found in his powerful dissent in
Doherty v. Thornburgh, 943 F.2d 204, 212 (2d Cir. 1991) (Altimari, J.
dissenting):
[i]t is a bitter irony that in this era in which totalitarian regimes are
adopting the language of freedom and looking to the United States
as a model of liberty and justice, we today find it acceptable that a
man who has not been charged with a crime in this country may
remain incarcerated here indefinitely. I have always believed that a
major difference between our Constitution and those that speak of
justice in bold terms, but fail to provide it in reality, is that our
Constitution provides for a judicial branch that is charged with the
task of safeguarding individuals' rights, be they citizens or not.
Id.
3 Indeed, a work remembering the Holocaust has a proud place at Touro.
Aquinas referred to God as an artist, and Judge Altimari was clearly a
loving apprentice. F.C. COPLESTON, AQUINAS 220 (1970).
5 As Judge Altimari himself has written, "it should always be remembered
that a doctrinaire fixity of views is a judge's anathema. JuJges cannot and
should not be staunch apostles or advocates of any creed no matter how lucid
the vision--and yes, we all have a vision we know to be absolu e truth." Frank
X. Altimari, The Practice of Dissenting In The Second Circut , 59 BROOK. L.
REv. 275, 277 (Summer 1993).
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school" values and his critical respect for traditional values and
institutions, including the doctrine of stare decisis, is indicative of
a conservative of Burkean bent.6 Finally, Judge Altimari had a
libertarian streak that often reared its head and was reminiscent of
John Stuart Mill's teachings.7 These three sources of inspiration
were the tools alive in the Judge's hands as he carved out his

judicial legacy on the federal bench.
SOURCES OF INSPIRATION

From Aquinas, Judge Altimari developed his faith in natural
law, and his belief in a rational evaluation of law as an instrument
to achieve human fulfillment. Aquinas believed that knowledge
could be obtained by both faith and reason, and that law is "an

ordinance of reason made for the common good by him, who has
charge of the community, and promulgated."" For Aquinas, "the
primary precept of the law is that good should be done and

pursued and evil avoided; and on this are founded all the other
precepts of the law of nature." ' Because he viewed law as an
6 Judge Altimari has expressly acknowledged the importance of prior

precedent, and the fact that he was bound not only by Supreme Court
precedent but by prior Second Circuit panels. Altimari, supra note 5, at 278.
Judge Altimari specifically referred to Dunlap-McCuller v. Riese Org., 980
F.2d 153, 157-58 (2d Cir. 1993), where "[e]ven though the members of the
panel that heard Dunlap-McCullerwere frustrated by the fact that precedent
precluded us from reviewing the district court's grant of a new trial, we were
bound to apply this precedent to the facts at hand. The opinion, however, does
express the panel's frustration in the hope that the rule in the Second Circuit
may someday be modified." Altimari, supranote 5, at 278 n.9.
7 Some theorists view Burkean conservativism and libertarianism to be a
"blood feud" that cannot be reconciled. See, e.g., STEPHEN L NEVAN,
LIBERALISM AT Wrr's END: THE LIBERTARIAN REVOLT AGAINST THE
MODERN STATE, 32-33 (1984). However, Judge Altimari took seriously the
difference between self-regarding and other-regarding actions, and in so doing
he was able to carve out an appropriate place for pragmatic intervention by
state institutions. Nevertheless, Judge Altimari saw the need for strict limits on
government conduct.
8 T. AQUINAS, I SMMiA THEOLOGICA, q. 90, art. 4, at 495 (Dominican
Fathers' ed. 1947).
9
Id. q. 94.
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ordinance of reason, Aquinas believed that the common good of
the community could be rationally discerned as universal
principles of morality. The common good aggregated the
individual good of each member of the community, and depended
upon the realization of human fulfillment. Laws are "just" if
under rational examination they promote the realization of this
human fulfillment; because human fulfillment is a tenet of the
natural law, it becomes a rational method of determining the
morality of law. 1" A law that hinders human fulfillment would
be unjust or immoral. But Aquinas cannot be classified as a
utilitarian or a relativist, since he viewed natural moral law is
unalterable, 1 promulgated by the very fact that God instilled
man's mind to recognize these laws naturally. 2
Judge Altimari's faith in the justness of law, though, was
tempered by his distrust of external regulation derived from John
Stuart Mill. For Mill, whose espousal of libertarianism may be at
odds with his earlier writings on utilitarianism, liberty is essential
to human fulfillment."
Mill's antipathy toward intrusive
government regulation is founded on the belief that human beings
can achieve intellectual and moral fulfillment only in a sphere
free from external regulation that allows them to explore their
individuality.14 "It is not by wearing down into uniformity all
that is individual in themselves, but by cultivating it and calling it
forth, within the limits imposed by the rights and interests of
10

Aquinas did recognize, however, that the powers of human reason and

persuasion are limited, and so must often be supplemented by the exercise of
formal authority in determining the very content of law.
See, e.g., T.
AQUINAS, TREATISE ON LAw 78 (Gateway ed., 1965).
This observation is
similar to Edmund Burke's desire to make the world safe for human beings of
limited rationality, "by suggesting ways of operating and preserving a political
system that do not require unrealistic rational faculties in either the governors
or the governed."
Ernest Young, Rediscovering Conservatism: Burkean
Political Theory and Constitutional Interpretation, N.C. L. REV. 619, 645
(March 1994).
1 See supra note 3, at 226.
12 T. AQUINAS, I SUMMA THEOLOGICA 614-15 (Modem Library College ed.,
1945).
13JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY 54 (David Spitz ed., 1975) (1859).
14 Id. at 58.
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others, that human beings become a noble and beautiful object of
contemplation ... ." Mill differentiated self-regarding from
other-regarding actions, and argued that only to the extent that an
individual's actions affect others should that individual be
subjected to regulation or punishment.
[IThere is a sphere of action in which society, as
distinguished from the individual, has, if any, only an
indirect interest: comprehending all that portion of a
person's life and conduct which affects only himself or,
if it also affects others, only with their free, voluntary,
and undeceived consent and participation. When I say
only himself, I mean directly and in the first instance;
for whatever affects himself may affect others through
himself; and the objection which may be grounded on
this contingency will receive consideration in the sequel.
This, then, is the appropriate region of human liberty.
... [T]he principle requires liberty of tastes and
pursuits, of framing the plan of our life to suit our own
character, of doing as we like, subject to such
consequences as may follow, without impediment from
our fellow creatures, so long as what we do does not'
harm them, even though they should think our conduct
foolish, perverse, or wrong... No society in which
these liberties are not, on the whole, respected is free,
whatever may be its form of government; and none is
completely free in which they do not exist absolute and
unqualified. The only freedom which deserves the name
is that of pursuing our own good in our own way, so
long as we do not attempt to deprive others of theirs or
impede their efforts to obtain it. Each is the proper
guardian of his own health, whether bodily or mental
and spiritual. Mankind are greater gainers by suffering
each other to live as seems good to themselves than by
compelling each to live as seems good to the rest.' 5
'5 State v. Erickson, 574 P.2d 1, 24 (Alaska 1978) (Mathews, J., concurring)
(quoting JoHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY (1848)).
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Mill deferred to individual rights and warned against the tyranny
of the majority, but only in the context of self-regarding actions.16
Edmund Burke similarly wished to protect society from a
tyranny of the majority. For Burke, though, the best protection
against tyranny was the reliance on traditional institutions that
were rooted in the societies in which they had developed. Burke
was not opposed to change, rather he was opposed to the
wholesale revamping of societies based upon abstract
theorization. Burke viewed prudence and pragmatism as virtues,
and unfettered revolutionary zeal as a vice.
Burke's thinking must be clearly distinguished from that of
Aquinas, because for Burke there were no universals that could
be rationally affirmed on any moral or any political subject.
Burke's pessimism stands in stark contrast with the general
optimism of Aquinas.
While both saw limits to human
rationality, Burke saw stark limits to human potential, and
believed that human beings should not be experimenting with
different forms of governments. Burke was not seeking to make
the world safe for either democracy or self-regarding actions, but
rather was attempting to make the world safe for human beings of
limited rationality, by suggesting ways of operating and
preserving a political system that do not require unrealistic
rational faculties in either the governors or the governed.
An ignorant man, who is not fool enough to meddle with
his clock, is however sufficiently confident to think he
can safely take to pieces, and put together at his
pleasure, a moral machine of another guise, importance
and complexity, composed of far other wheels, and
springs, and balances, and counteracting and
co-operating powers. Men little think how immorally
See MILL, supra note 13, at 67. For Judge Altimari, abortion was clearly
not a self-regarding action. He viewed the human fetus as a human being from
conception, and, consequently, saw abortion as an act of murder. The
teachings of Aquinas suggested to him that this was a violation of natural law.
Nevertheless, Judge Altimari most seriously undertook his duty to uphold the
Constitution, and he recognized that he had to enforce the law of the land.
16
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they act in rashly meddling with what they do not
understand. Their delusive good intention is no sort of
excuse for their presumption. They who truly mean well
must be fearful of acting ill.
Burke saw a prescriptive wisdom inherent in long-standing
institutions, and believed that reform must occur gradually, and
each step made cautiously.
By a slow but well-sustained progress, the effect of each
step is watched; the good or ill success of the first, gives
light to us in the second; and so, from light to light, we
are conducted with safety through the whole series. We
see that the parts of the system do not clash. The evils
latent in the most promising contrivances are provided
for as they arise. One advantage is as little as possible
sacrificed to another. We compensate, we reconcile, we
balance. We are enabled to unite into a consistent whole
the various anomalies and contending principles that are
found in the minds and affairs of men.18
The gradual development and progression of the common law in
the United States, with its reliance on the principle of stare
decisis and its respect for long-standing principles and
institutions, is clearly an evolutionary process that Burke would
applaud. Judge Altimari was a student of the common law, and
his prudent and pragmatic application of the common law for the
common good and the protection of individual liberties - as long
as they did not intrude upon the common good - suggest an

17 EDMUND

BURKE,

An Appeal from the New to the Old Whigs, in 1 THE

WoRKs OF THE RIGHT HON. EDMwND BURKE 535 (Harry G. Bohn ed., 1841)
(1791).
" EDMUND BuRKE, Reflections on the Revolution in France, in 8 THE
WRTNGS AND SPEECHES OF EDMUND BuRKE 217 (Paul Langford ed.,
Clarendon Press 1989) (1791).
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enlighted and well-meaning, if imperfect,
philosophies of Aquinas, Burke, and Mill. '9

[Vol 15
meshing of the

JUGE ALTIMR's JUDICIAL SCULPTURES

Youing v. New York City TransitAuthority
The most well known of Judge Altimari's opinions is Young v.
New York City TransitAuthority.2 In Young, the issue on appeal
was whether the prohibition of begging and panhandling in the
New York City subway system violated the First Amendment."
The New York City Transit Authority ("TA") and Metropolitan
Transportation Authority of the State of New York ("MTA")
were appealing from a permanent injunction prohibiting the TA
from enforcing a regulation prohibiting begging in the subways."

"' Many, if not most, of the decisions rendered by Second Circuit panels on
which Judge Altimari sat while we were clerks were dictated by prior
precedent, general principles of law, and/or statutory or regulatory mandate
such as the Federal Sentencing Guidelines. Judge Altimari's clerks devised a
methodology for dividing up the preparation of bench memorandum for these
cases. Cases would be categorized by the senior clerk, who had a minimum of
one year of experience, as hard, medium, and easy, based on the number of
issues raised, the length of the briefs, the standard of review, and the
reputation of the district court judge. The senior clerk would pick first, and
choose a hard case to begin with. A case, for example, involving an issue of
whether a well-respected judge abused his or her discretion in applying the
federal sentencing guidelines would typically be categorized as an easy case.
A federal diversity case raising a number of issues involving choice of law and
issues of contract interpretation to be reviewed de nova would be categorized
as a medium case. Easy and medium cases could typically be resolved in
Burkean fashion by reference to prior precedent and general principles of law.
There were, however, cases that required both judge and clerk to look beyond
the four comers of the briefs and record on appeal, and to evaluate the effect
of a decision on the common good of a society and the potential impingement
on individual liberty. Nevertheless, Judge Altimari read every brief for every
case, as well as the bench memorandum and proposed recommendations
drafted by his clerks, and prepared himself thoroughly for oral argument.
20 903 F.2d 146 (2d Cir. 1990).
21 Id. at 147.
22N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 21, § 1050.6 (1989).
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The district court had concluded that begging constituted speech
that warranted full First Amendment protection.'
In January 1989, the MTA and TA began a rule-making
process to amend the existing regulation, which prohibited
anyone from soliciting "alms, subscription or contribution for any
purpose."' After four public hearings, an amendment was added
that permitted greater utilization of the subways for certain
non-commercial activities such as: "public speaking; distribution
of written materials; solicitation for charitable, religious or
political causes; and artistic performances, including the
acceptance of donations." In particular, the amendment allowed
solicitation for charitable, religious, or political causes only in
certain places in the subway system?
The TA then commenced "Operation Enforcement," a program
designed to enforce the prohibition on begging and panhandling
in the subway. The TA initially distributed 1,500,000 pamphlets
that summarized 11 TA rules, including "No panhandling or
begging," and displayed the rules on 15,000 posters throughout
the subway system. Both the pamphlets and the posters warned
that violation of the TA rules could lead to arrest, fine or
26
ejection.
Subsequently, the Legal Action Center for the Homeless
("LACH") filed suit in the district court on behalf of itself and
two homeless men, William B. Young and Joseph Walley, as
representative plaintiffs for a class of homeless and needy persons
who begged and panhandled in the New York City subway
system. The complaint alleged that the prohibition of begging
and panhandling in the subway contravened plaintiffs rights to
free speech, due process, and equal protection of the law.'
Specifically, the plaintiffs argued that the extension of a hand by
a homeless and needy person was protected speech, and that there
was no legitimate distinction between solicitation for charitable,
23 Young, 903 F.2d at 148.
24 N.Y. CoMP. CODES R. & REGs. tit. 21,

§ 1050.6(b).

§ 1050.6(c)(1) and (2).
Young, 903 F.2d at 149.
2 Id.
2
2
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religious or political causes and solicitation of alms by private
individuals.' They maintained that the total ban on begging and
29
panhandling in the system was constitutionally impermissible."
District Judge Leonard Sand, upon initial oral argument,
appeared to agree that the distinction between solicitation for alms
and solicitation for charitable purposes was impermissibly vague;
consequently, the TA amended the regulation on December 15,
1989, to read: "No person shall panhandle or beg upon any
facility or conveyance." 30 The revised regulation also prohibited
all solicitation for charity except by specified organizations.31
Despite these revisions to the statute, the district court granted
the request for a preliminary injunction, 32 stating that there was
no distinction between charitable solicitation and begging, and
concluding that begging could therefore be protected by the First
Amendment. The district court held that the total ban on begging
and panhandling was not "tailored narrowly to serve a state
interest," and that reasonable time, place, and manner restrictions
should be promulgated.33 The court subsequently converted a
preliminary injunction against enforcing the prohibition of
begging and panhandling to a permanent injunction and directed
that begging and panhandling be permitted on subway platforms
and mezzanines except when under construction, repair, or
maintenance, while simultaneously prohibiting such behavior
temporarily on subway trains and in the restricted areas where

2 id.
2 Id.
30 N.Y. COMP. CODES R. &REas. tit. 21, § 1050.6(b)(2) (1989).
" Specifically, organizations that: (1) have been licensed for any public
solicitation within the preceding twelve months by the Commissioner of Social
Services of the City of New York under Sec. 21-111 of the Administrative
Code of the City of New York or any successor provision, or (2) are duly
registered as charitable organizations with the Secretary of State of the State of
New York under See. 172 of the New York Executive Law or any successor
provision, or (3) are exempt from federal income tax under See. 501(c)(3) of
the United States Internal Revenue Code or any successor provision.
§ 1050.6(c).
32 729 F. Supp. 341 (S.D.N.Y. 1990).
31Young, 903 F.2d at 153.
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organized charitable solicitations were prohibited under 21
N.Y.C.R.R. Sec. 1050.6(c).
In his opinion reversing the district court and upholding the
regulations against the First Amendment challenge, Judge
Altimari began by colorfully discussing the realities of the
subway system:
The New York City Subway System transports
approximately 3,500,000 passengers on an average
workday, operates twenty-four hours a day, seven days a
week, and consists of 648 miles of track, 468 subway
stations and over 6,000 subway cars. Many parts of the
subway system are almost one hundred years old. In a
timeworn routine of New York City life, each day a
multitude descends the steep and long staircases and
mechanical escalators to wait on narrow and crowded
platforms bounded by dark tunnels and high power
electrical rails.
He placed particular emphasis on a research study that revealed
that two-thirds of the subway riders had been intimidated into
giving money to beggars. Passengers perceived that beggars
pervaded the subway system, considering beggars to be a
significant problem. Begging caused passengers to feel harassed
and intimidated, and generated "high levels of fear in the
passengers, thereby discouraging use of the system."35
Judge Altimari noted that there was a significant difference
between begging in the subway and begging on the streets of New
York:

Open city streets allow pedestrians what sociologists
term "fate-control", or the ability to avoid and move
away from an intimidating person. To the contrary,
subway riders enjoy considerably less fluidity of
movement and ability to control what happens to them.
34Id.
3

Id. at 149-50.
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Whether standing in the crush of riders in a speeding
subway car, waiting among the pressing masses on a
platform, or swarming with the throng through a maze
of mezzanines, staircases and ramps, the rider feels

"captive"

36

Judge Altimari began his legal analysis by expressing "grave
doubt as to whether begging and panhandling in the subway are
sufficiently imbued with a communicative character to justify
constitutional protection," stating that "the real issue here is
whether begging constitutes the kind of "expressive conduct"
protected to some extent by the First Amendment. "31
The Judge observed that "[c]ommon sense tells us that begging
is much more 'conduct' than it is 'speech.'" 38 Begging is not
"inseparably intertwined with a 'particularized message.'" This
is because common sense suggests that beggars are not seeking to
convey any particular social or political message, but rather are
seeking to collect money. While Judge Altimari acknowledged
that a beggar may have an intent to convey a message, such as "I
am homeless" to the subway passenger, there is a likelihood that
this message will be lost as a result of the threat of the action
itself.39 "In the subway, it is the conduct of begging and
panhandling, totally independent of any particularized message,
that passengers experience as threatening, harassing and
intimidating." 4" Judge Altimari distinguished begging from the
burning of a flag or the wearing a black ann-band, which are
actions intended to convey a particular message: "Mhe object of
begging and panhandling is the transfer of money. Speech simply
is not inherent to the act; it is not of the essence of the
conduct. ,41
Judge Altimari also drew a First Amendment distinction
In particular,
between solicitations for charity and begging.
36Id. at 150.

37 Id.
38
31

id.

Id. at 153.
4Id. at 154.
41 Id.
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Altimari focused on the Supreme Court's decision in Village of
Schawnburg v. Citizens for a Better Environment,4 for its
reasoning that appeals of organized charities "involve a variety of
speech interests" including "communication of information, the
dissemination and propagation of views and ideas, and the
advocacy of causes." 4' Solicitation for charities, according to the
Supreme Court in Schauznburg, also involves informative and
persuasive speech designed to seek support for particular causes
or particular points of view." "Canvassers in such contexts are
necessarily more than solicitors for money" and do "more than
inform private economic decisions." 4" Judge Altimari, therefore,
concluded that the TA's allowing of solicitation by organized
charities in certain areas of the subway system, while totally
prohibiting begging and panhandling, was consistent with the rule
of law promulgated by the Supreme Court in Schaunberg.4' The
Judge held that the TA had reasonably concluded that while
solicitation by organized charities could be contained to certain
areas of the system, the problems posed by begging and
panhandling could be addressed by nothing less than the
enforcement of a total ban.
Young v. New York City Transit Authority was one of those
difficult cases that put Judge Altimari's personal and
philosophical beliefs in opposition. While Judge Altimari, like
Mills, was always cautious about permitting unnecessary
government intrusion, he saw begging in the close confines of the
New York City subway system as an other-regarding action that
impinged upon the well-being of the vast number of people who
used the system to commute to and from work each day. Judge
Altimari's decision was grounded in the pragmatic reality of
everyday life, and the need for law to be an instrument of human
fulfillment.47 The subway system, at the time, was filled with
4 444 U.S. 620
4Id. at 632.

(1980).

44Id.
4Id.

Young, 903 F.2d at 154.
' As Oliver Wendell Holmes noted, "The life of the law has not been logic:
it has been experience." OLIvER WENDELL HoL mEs, Book Notice, 14 AM. L.
4
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aggressive beggars and was viewed as a dangerous place by
numerous commuters who shunned the subways for more
cumbersome forms of transportation.
Given the Judge's strong charitable impulses, and his Aquinian
concern for the common good, he must have seen the decision as
splitting the difference, allowing charitable appeals by
organizations but not by individuals. Moreover, the regulations
at issue did not preclude begging on city streets or in other lessconfined areas. Judge Altimari was, therefore, not sentencing
beggars to death and starvation; rather, he was upholding the
right of a governmental entity, which had studied the issue, to
promulgate regulations designed to promote the common good.
This decision was grounded, like good Burkean jurisprudence, on
prior Supreme Court and Second Circuit First Amendment
decisions and was limited to the issue at hand. It was clearly
Judge Altimari's intent to promote the safety, security, and
convenience of a vast number of commuters without
unnecessarily impinging upon the human fulfillment of beggars,
who could continue to operate in less confined quarters.
Doe v. City of New York
In Doe v. City of New York, 48 a plaintiff sued the New York
City Commission on Human Rights alleging that his constitutional
right to privacy was violated when the Commission revealed to
the public that he was infected with the Human
Immunodeficiency Virus ("HIV"). The Commission had publicly
revealed a conciliation agreement Doe had reached with Delta
Airlines, settling a discrimination complaint.49
In 1989, Doe learned that he was infected with IIV, the virus
that eventually causes Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome
("AIDS"). According to Doe, "his HIV status was an intensely
personal matter which he did not share even with his family, his
RFwv. 233, 234, reprinted in 3 THE COLLECTED WORKs OF JUSTICE HOLMES
103 (Sheldon M. Novick ed., 1995) (1880).
4'15 F.3d 264 (2d Cir. 1994).
4 Id. at 265.
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friends, or his colleagues at work for fear of ostracism and
discrimination."
Only his doctor, his attorney, and others
involved in prosecuting his case knew of his condition.
Doe worked for Pan American World Airways during Pan
Am's 1991 bankruptcy and Delta's subsequent acquisition of
many of Pan Am's services. Doe applied for a position with
Delta but his application was denied. Doe subsequently filed
charges with the Commission against Delta, alleging that Delta
had not hired him because he was a single gay male and because
it suspected that he was H[V positive.
Delta and Doe subsequently entered into the conciliation
agreement, and Delta hired Doe as a customer-services agent.
The agreement contained a confidentiality provision stating that
"[e]xcept as required by any court or agency or upon the written
consent of Doe or his attorney, Delta and the [Commission's Law
Enforcement] Bureau agree not to disclose Doe's given name
through any oral or written communication which identifies Doe
by his given name as the plaintiff in this lawsuit or as a settling
party to this Conciliation Agreement to any person that is not a
5
party to or involved with this proceeding.
Notwithstanding this provision, the Commission subsequently
issued a press release disclosing the terms of the agreement,
without the knowledge or consent of Doe or Doe's counsel. A
number of New York newspapers published articles based upon
the press release. Although the press release did not expressly
name Doe, Doe alleged that it contained enough information to
allow those who knew or worked with Doe to identify him as the
individual described in the press release. According to Doe, his
colleagues at Delta became aware of his IV status, and this
caused him to suffer discrimination and embarrassment at work,
resulting in emotional distress."
Doe brought suit against the Commission and the City of New
York seeking damages and alleging violations of his constitutional
rights and breach of contract. The district court dismissed the
complaint, finding that the settlement was a public record in
m Id.
51Id.
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which there could be no reasonable expectation of privacy, 52 and
further held that Doe's IV status had been made a matter of
public record once Doe filed a complaint with the Commission.53
Judge Altimari's opinion centered on whether Doe had a
constitutional right to privacy regarding his HIV status and
whether that right was waived when he brought a discrimination
complaint to the Commissions' The Judge quickly concluded, in
one of the first judgments of its kind in the jurisprudence, that
"[i]ndividuals who are infected with the HIV virus clearly possess
a constitutional right to privacy regarding their condition."
According to Judge Altimari, HIV status was a personal matter,
and, was, therefore, entitled to constitutional protection as
confidential information about one's health.55
Extension of the right to confidentiality to personal
medical information recognizes there are few matters
that are quite so personal as the status of one's health,
and few matters the dissemination of which one would
prefer to maintain greater control over. Clearly, an
individual's choice to inform others that she has
contracted what is at this point invariably and sadly a
fatal, incurable disease is one that she should normally
be allowed to make for herself. This would be true for
any serious medical condition, but is especially true with
regard to those infected with HIV or living with AIDS,
considering the unfortunately unfeeling attitude among
52

825 F. Supp. 36 (S.D.N.Y. 1993).

The District Court cited to the

Administrative Code of the City of New York, Sec. 8-115(d)
(Cum.Supp.1991) ("Administrative Code"), which provides that "[e]very
conciliation agreement shall be made public unless the complainant and
respondent agree otherwise and the commission determines that disclosure is
not required to further the purposes of this chapter."
53id.

5415 F.3d at 265.

55Id. (citing Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 599 (1977) (recognizing that
there exists in the United States Constitution a right to privacy protecting "the
individual interest in avoiding disclosure of personal matters."); Nixon v.
Administrator of General Services, 433 U.S. 425, 457 (1977) (reaffirming
existence of right to privacy in personal information)).
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many in this society toward those coping with the
disease. An individual revealing that she is HIV
seropositive potentially exposes herself not to
understanding or compassion but to discrimination and
intolerance, further necessitating the extension of the
right to confidentiality over such information.56

Judge Altimari then evaluated whether this right to
confidentiality was waived by Doe's entering into a conciliation
agreement that, pursuant to the City of New York's
Administrative Code, became a public document. While Judge
Altimari noted that an individual cannot expect to have a
constitutionally protected privacy interest in matters of public
record, he questioned whether Doe's I[V status automatically
needed to become a matter of public record or whether it became
such a matter simply because the Commission chose to make it
public. Judge Altimari rejected the City's argument that Doe had
no reasonable expectation of privacy once he filed a claim with
the Commission and entered into the agreement, simply because
the administrative code automatically required public disclosure
of all conciliation agreements.
According to Judge Altimari, the statute authorizing disclosure
did not require, without exception, publication of a conciliation
agreement. Indeed, the applicable administrative code states that
conciliation agreements "shall be made public unless the
complainant and respondent agree otherwise and the commission
determines that disclosure is not required." 57 Consequently,
Judge Altimari pointed out, the statute contemplates exceptions to
the general rule in cases where the parties and the Commission
agree or where the Commission exercises its discretion in a
situation where an individual might expect that his privacy would
be protected. Judge Altimari's opinion went on to note that:
the city's argument ignores the very nature of a
Commission on Human Rights. The city essentially
SId. at 268.
57 NEw YORK,

N.Y., ADmI

ATIVE CODE § 8-115(d).
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contends that any individual seeking assistance from the
particular public agency specifically authorized to
vindicate his human and civil rights automatically
relinquishes any rights of privacy he might have
regarding his claim. This ignores the fact that the
purpose of the Commission is to protect the human
rights of the people of New York, which include the
right to privacy in certain types of personal information.
An Orwellian statute that mindlessly and indifferently
mandated that any and all information provided to the
Commission automatically became a public record--even
in cases where the reason the complainant went to the
Commission was because of a violation of a right to
privacy--would be patently inconsistent with the
protection of individual privacy rights, and thereby
inconsistent with the purposes of the Commission....
To claim ...

that because the Commission is a public

agency all information provided to it is automatically a
matter of public record is to undermine entirely the
purpose of a Commission on Human Rights, and to
heedlessly make public that which is often surely
intended to remain private. We refuse to believe that the
statute could have been intended to yield such a result.58
Given this reading of the administrative code, Judge Altimari's
opinion reversed the district court's dismissal because Doe could
prove at trial that the confidentiality provision of his agreement
led him to believe that the Commission would exercise its
discretion to keep his IlV status private. The opinion noted that
there were numerous issues still to be resolved, including whether
the City had a substantial interest in issuing the press release
announcing the Agreement that outweighed Doe's privacy
interest.
In Doe v. City of New York, Judge Altimari's libertarian streak
is clearly visible. Indeed, he cites Justice Brandeis' dissent in
58

Doe, 15 F.3d at 268-69.
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Olmstead v. United States, 9 for the proposition that "the right to
be let alone" is "the right most valued by civilized men." Doe's
right to privacy as an MEV positive gay male was viewed by
Judge Altimari as an important right that deserved Constitutional
protection, but Judge Altimari also recognized the possibility that
there might be countervailing state interests at issue. Judge
Altimari's decision in Doe seems consistent with the principle
outlined by John Stuart Mill that "[e]ach is the proper guardian of
his own health, whether bodily or mental and spiritual. Manldnd
are greater gainers by suffering each other to live as seems good
to themselves than by compelling each to live as seems good to
the rest.""0 While we knew that Judge Altimari viewed certain
conduct that often led to the transmission of the tIRV virus as
"foolish, perverse, or wrong" ,6 he nevertheless concluded that
one's status as an HIV sufferer was a private matter, and that the
government should only disseminate this information if it had a
compelling interest to do so, if an individual had given his or her
consent to disseminate this information, or if an individual had
clearly waived the right to privacy. 62

5' 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).

o State v. Erickson, 574 P.2d 1, 24 (Alaska 1978) (Mathews, J., concurring)
(quoting JoHN STUART MILL, ON LImERTY (1848)).
6 Id.

In a later opinion, Doe v. Marsh, 105 F.3d 106 (2d Cir. 1997), Judge
Altimari concluded that reasonable state officials could have concluded that
plaintiffs had waived their right to privacy concerning their HIV status.
Plaintiffs had previously identified themselves before seminar and conference
audiences as persons living with HIV and one of the individuals disclosed her
HIV-positive status in an educational video tape. The plaintiffs alleged that the
New York State Department of Education had violated their right to privacy by
publishing their condition in an IV prevention education manual. However,
based on the prior dissemination of their HIV status, Judge Altimari concluded
that the state officials had acted in an objectively reasonable manner by
publishing their status.
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Valmonte v. Bain
The third case that illustrates some of Judge Altimari's judicial
and personal values was Valmonte v. Bain,63 which involved a
challenge by a suspected child abuser to the New York State
Central Register of Child Abuse and Maltreatment (the "Central
Register"). The case presented difficult issues concerning the
sufficiency of procedural protections for those accused of child
abuse and neglect, and the Judge's opinion in this case not only
demonstrates his overriding sense of justice and his keen belief in
the value of fair processes, but also his courage to take a bold,
innovative, and principled stand in favor of unsympathetic
parties.
New York's Central Register contained a list of individuals that
the state or county departments of social services had found were
in some way abusive or neglectful of children." The main legal
issues in the case concerned the procedural protections that were
in place to protect individuals from being unfairly placed on the
list, particularly with regard to the standard of evidence that was
sufficient to support a person's inclusion.65 Individuals were
initially placed on the list based on a complaint to the Register's
hotline alleging child abuse or neglect.66 Operators passed that
report on to the local social services department, prompting an
investigation to determine whether a complaint was "indicated,"
meaning that it was supported by at least "some credible
evidence." 67 If the report was "indicated," the subject
of the
68
report was automatically listed on the Central Register.
Although the names of individuals on the Central Register were
generally kept confidential, there were statutory provisions that
required certain employers in the child care field to consult with
6'18 F.3d 992 (2d Cir. 1994).
64Id. at 995.
6 Id.

' The statutory scheme for the Central Register is more complicated that we
need for our analysis, but is discussed in greater depth in Judge Altimari's
exhaustive opinion. See 18 F.3d at 995-97.
67 18

F.3d at 995.

6 id.

https://digitalcommons.tourolaw.edu/lawreview/vol15/iss4/10

20

Rosh and Rand: Tribute

1999

TRIBUTE

1459

the Register to determine whether potential employees were
listed.6 9 The purpose of this statutorily-required consultation was

to ensure that individuals included on the Central Register did not
become employed in positions where they would have contact
with children. Indeed, an employer wishing to hire the listed
individual in spite of the report on the Register would have to
maintain a written record as to why the employer thought it was
appropriate to hire the individual."0
There were ways for the individual to challenge her inclusion
on the Central Register, but at each step of the appeals process
within the social service bureaucracy, the adjudicating body only
had to find that the report was supported by "some credible
evidence," the same standard applied for the initial determination.
For example, the listed individual could appeal to the state
department of social services to ask for the expungement of the
report, but state DSS would deny the expungement request if
there was some credible evidence supporting the allegation.7
After denial, the listed individual could ask for an administrative
hearing before the state's department of social service's
commissioner's office, but again the commission would only
require the local county department to prove the allegations by
"some credible evidence."'
The allegations needed to meet a higher standard of proof only
after the listed individual lost her job because of her placement on
the Central Register, or lost prospective employment because of
the employer's statutorily-required consultation of the list. The
subject then had the right to a "post-deprivation hearing" before
the state department of social services.' At this hearing, the state
would have to prove the charges against her by a "fair
9

id.

Id.
The state department of social services would actually conduct a two-part
review, the second part determining whether the acts alleged could be
"relevant and reasonably related" to child-care employment. 18 F.3d at 996.
70
7'

This second part of the review, present throughout the appellate process within
the social services department review, was not materially at issue in Valmonte.
72 Id.
73
Id. at 997.
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preponderance of the evidence," not the "some credible
evidence" standard. If the state failed to meet this higher
standard of proof, the state would not inforn employers of the
individual's inclusion on the Register.
Anna Valmonte got involved with this system when someone
reported to the Central Register that she had slapped her young
daughter. 74 Her name was placed on the Register by the county
department of social services, and her subsequent appeals to the
state department and the commissioner under the "some credible
evidence" standard were unsuccessful. 75 Because she was never
actually denied employment in the child care field, she never had
the opportunity for a post-deprivation hearing under the higher
preponderance standard.
Valmonte subsequently brought an action in the Southern
District of New York challenging the constitutionality of the
statutory scheme on numerous grounds including due process
allegations that the procedural protections for inclusion on the
Register did not adequately protect Valmonte's liberty interest.7"
The district court initially dismissed all of the case except for the
due process claims, finding that the some credible evidence
standard left open too great a possibility of error. 7" Ultimately,
though, the district court dismissed the entire action, finding that
there was no implication of liberty interests if the Central
Register was available only to prospective employers, not to the
public at large.78

In his long and thorough opinion, Judge Altimari ultimately
reversed the holding of the district court, finding that Valmonte
' Valmonte claimed in her appeal that she was disciplining her daughter for
stealing. Id. This may be important insofar as the factual context supported
the general theory of the appeal that an "Orwellian" state was interfering in the
choices made by a mother in raising her child. Since child abusers generally
make for unsympathetic plaintiffs, it was clearly a benefit for the putative class
action to have a named plaintiff with whom the Court could identify and
perhaps empathize with.
7 id.

76 M. at 998.
77 788 F. Supp. 745 (S.D.N.Y. 1993).
7 812 F. Supp. 423 (S.D.N.Y. 1993).
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did have a liberty interest that was implicated by the Central
Register, one that was not adequately protected by the "some
credible evidence" standard used by the state social services
departments.79 There were two very close due process issues
raised in Valmonte, the first regarding whether there was a
protectible liberty interest, and the second involving whether, if
there was such an interest, the procedural protections were
sufficient. For both issues, Judge Altimari engaged in a nuanced,
innovative analysis of the facts that went beyond the easy surface
issues to examine the relationship of the individual and the state
in modem society.
The first question addressed was whether Valmonte could have
a protectible liberty interest implicated by inclusion on the
Central Register if she never actually suffered anything other than
the defamation, given that she had never lost employment from
an employer's consultation with the list. Under prevailing
Supreme Court and Second Circuit precedent, damage to
reputation alone was insufficient to invoke the procedural
protections of the Due Process Clause."0 Rather, a plaintiff
alleging a violation of liberty needed to show "stigma plus,"
meaning that there was loss of reputation coupled with some
other, more tangible, deprivation."1 The Court found that there
was no question that inclusion on the list damaged Valmonte's
reputation by "branding her as a child abuser,"8 2 but also had to
face the tougher question of whether there was any additional
tangible deprivation since Valmonte had not applied for any
position with a child care agency since her inclusion on the list,
and thus had not lost any existing or prospective employment
because of the employer's statutorily-required consultation with
the list. The state argued that Valmonte was unable to secure
employment in her chosen field simply because of her damaged
-' Valmonte, 18 F.3d at 1005.
80 See Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 701 (1976) (holding that reputational
damage is not "by itself sufficient to invoke the procedural protection of the
Due Process Clause.").

" Id.

See also Neu v. Corcoran, 869 F.2d 662, 667 (2d Cir. 1989)

(establishing "stigma plus" analysis).
'2 Valmonte, 18 F.3d at 1000.
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reputation, which is insufficient to support a substantive due
process claim.
It would have been very easy for the court to look at the fact
that Valmonte had not actually lost existing employment, and
affirm the dismissal of her claim on that basis. But in looking at
the actual statutory scheme in place, and how it realistically
affected the lives of people included on the Central Register,
Judge Altimari formulated a bold and carefully-crafted argument
that the operation of the Register did cause a tangible deprivation
of Valmonte's liberty:
The Central Register does not simply defame Valmonte,
it places a tangible burden on her employment prospects
• ..[B]y operation of law, her potential employers will
be informed specifically about her inclusion on the
Central Register and will therefore choose not to hire
her. Moreover, if they do wish to hire her, those
employers are required by law to explain the reasons
why in writing.
This is not just the intangible
deleterious effect that flows from a bad reputation.
Rather, it is a specific deprivation of her opportunity to
seek employment caused by a statutory impediment
established by the state. Valmonte is not going to be
refused employment because of her reputation; she will
be refused employment simply because her inclusion on
the list results in an added burden on employers who will
therefore be reluctant to hire her.83
This was a rather remarkable interpretation of the "stigmaplus" test. It was not enough for Valmonte to assert that
employers would be unlikely to hire someone who was included
on the list. What made her inclusion on the Central Register an
infringement on her liberty interest was the statutory requirement
that employers not only consult with the Register -- which would
only "publish" the defamation -- but also provide written

documentation as to why they would hire someone listed there.
8Id.

at 1001.
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That is, the requirement that employers, if they hire someone on
the list, explain their reasoning in writing was the tangible
infringement on Valmonte's liberty, since it put a burden on the
employer's choice to hire her.
Having established that the Central Register implicated
Valmonte's liberty interest, the Court still had to determine
whether the procedural protections set up by the State were
sufficient to protect that interest. Applying the familiar Mathews
v. Eldridge4 test requiring a balancing of the nature of the private
interest, the state interest, and the risk of error and effect of
additional procedural safeguards, the Court quickly determined
that both Valmonte and the state had legitimate interests at stake,
but that there was a serious problem with the procedural
safeguards and their risk of error.85 Judge Altimari found that,
according to Valmonte's unchallenged figures,
nearly 75% of those who seek expungement of their
names from the list are ultimately successful. Half of
that number obtain expungement only after they have
lost employment or prospective employment because of
their inclusion on the Central Register. This means that
roughly one-third of those initially placed on the Central
Register are eventually removed once the local DSS is
required to prove the charges against the subject by a
fair preponderance of the evidence. The fact that only
25 % of those on the list remain after all administrative
proceedings have been concluded indicates that the initial
made by the local DSS is at best
determination
86
imperfect.

424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976).
18 F.3d at 1003.
Judge Altimari also noted that in oral
6 Valmonte, 18 F.3d at 1004.
argument Valmonte had asserted without challenge that a staggering 2,000,000
individuals were listed on the Central Register: "We find it difficult to fathom
how such a huge percentage of New Yorkers could be included on a list of
those suspected of child abuse and neglect, unless there has been a high rate of
error in determinations." Id.
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Judge Altimari was colorfully skeptical of the state's claims that
the "extraordinarily high percentage of reversals" demonstrated
that the procedures were working to correct initial mistaken
determinations, noting that "[o]ne does not normally purchase a
car from a dealer who stresses that his repair staff routinely
services and 7repairs the model after frequent and habitual
breakdowns. "
The Judge held that this high rate of error resulted from the
application of the "some credible evidence" standard throughout
the Central Register process until the post-deprivation hearing,
finding that the standard was "especially dubious in the context of
determining whether an individual has abused or neglected a
child," since such determinations were "inherently inflammatory"
and "open to [subjectivity when the fact finder is not required to
weigh evidence and judge competing versions of events." 88 The
Judge, true to his conservative instincts, did not prescribe what
standard of proof should apply at different stages of the process,
but the Court's holding invalidated a statutory scheme that only
required a preponderance of the evidence in a post-deprivation
hearing.
Judge Altimari's opinion in Valmonte is a good illustration of
his judicial and philosophical temperament. First, the Judge's
reasoning in finding that Valmonte had a liberty interest
implicated by the Central Register was a remarkable extension of
the "stigma-plus" test to a case where a plaintiff had not actually
lost anything at the time of suit, and demonstrates Judge
Altimari's sophisticated view of stare decisis in a case that had no
direct precedent.8 9 There was strong precedent holding that an
individual who had not actually been deprived of anything
tangible such as existing employment could not sustain a
substantive due process claim. 90 Similarly, Second Circuit law
was clear that defamation alone was insufficient to support a
7Id. at 1004.
8 Id. at 1004.
89 As the Judge acknowledged, "this is a unique situation, not previously
considered in the case law." Id. at 1001.
oSee, e.g., the discussion in Valmonte, 18 F.3d 1002 on the Second Circuit
decisions in cases where plaintiffs asserted only simple defamation.
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deprivation of a liberty interest.91 Judge Altimari's resolution of
the problem on the narrow facts, finding that this situation was
different because by operation of law Valmonte's employers
would have an added burden of being required to keep a written
record of why they would hire someone listed on the Central
Register, was a slender ground upon which to find a protectible
interest. After all, the requirement that employers make a written
justification for hiring someone listed on the Register was the
least likely way that Valmonte would have been deprived.
Realistically, it is unlikely that any child-care employer would
ever hire someone listed on something called the "Central
Register of Child Abuse and Maltreatment," not only for the
implied danger but also for the potential liability if the employee
lived down to the sullied reputation - employers would rarely be
called upon to provide a written justification for hiring such an
unlikely candidate for employment.
Valmonte was thus
aggrieved far more seriously by the requirement that employers
consult the list, but her tangible constitutional deprivation was in
the more mild and unassuming statutory requirement that an
employer willing to take the chance on hiring her would have to
provide written documentation as to why.
It is on this slender ground that Judge Altimari found cause to
question the entire statutory framework.
Using Burkean
reasoning, extending the "stigma-plus" line of cases from those
that only found a deprivation if the individual had actually lost
something to a case where, by operation of law, the plaintiff
would automatically lose something if she applied for a job, was
an innovative yet pragmatic way of resolving the case innovative because there was no direct precedent for the holding,
pragmatic because the result reached in the case reflected the real
harm that Valmonte would have endured had she chosen to work
in her chosen career.
Second, Valmonte also demonstrates the Judge's strong
libertarian streak, reminiscent of his influence from Mill that
liberty is essential, and state restrictions on that liberty should be
"' See the Judge's discussion of defamation cases in Valmonte, 18 F.3d at
1000.
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narrowly circumscribed. This could have been an easy case, a
decision based entirely on the district court opinion that directly if
narrow-mindedly followed the "stigma-plus" line of case. But
instead of reading precedent literally, without regard to the realworld ramifications, Judge Altimari examined what the Central
Register was really doing to Anna Valmonte, and found a narrow
yet legitimate reason for holding that her inclusion implicated her
liberty. Although he was rarely results-oriented, preferring
instead to follow the law wherever it led him, one is tempted to
think that the Judge found the entire statutory scheme too great an
imposition on personal liberties by the state, and found a subtle if
legitimate way to invalidate it through the back door.
Finally, Valmonte is revealing because the Judge was unafraid
to take a bold technical stand in favor of extremely unsympathetic
plaintiffs. There are few parties who engender as little public
sympathy as suspected child abusers, especially in the legal
environment of the past 10 years or so that has, for example,
witnessed the rise of post-incarceration registration of sexoffenders. Moreover, we know how the Judge - a devoted father
of four and grandfather of eleven who ceaselessly preached to his
clerks the blessings of parenthood" - would be personally
enraged by anyone who would dare mishandle what he viewed as
God's gift of a child. But the Judge, true to his judicial instincts,
rarely let such personal feelings intrude on his principled views of
personal liberty.
Although he would have been appalled
personally by the types of people who deserved inclusion on the
Central Register, he still was suspicious of a government
infringement on personal liberty that did not have adequate
procedural protections.
It is in such a context that the philosophies of Burke and Mill
arguably intersect, because both were concerned about the
tyranny of the majority and neither would have been satisfied
'9 Indeed, some of the Judge's encouragement of his clerks to marry and have
children bordered on, dare we fondly say, intimidation. It would make an
interesting sociological study to determine whether Judge Altimari's clerks bad

a higher marriage and birth rate than the average federal clerks, particularly
during the clerkship itself.
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with the institutional safeguards in place. Furthermore, a Central
Register that improperly tainted the reputation of 75 % of the
people on it because of the lack of procedural safeguards is unjust
and does not serve the common good of the community, therefore
violative of the principles enunciated by Aquinas.
Conclusion
It is difficult to assess the judicial legacy of a United States
Court of Appeals judge. Unlike colleagues in the United States
District Court or the appellate courts of discretionary jurisdiction,
who have some control over their dockets and have more freedom
to choose cases upon which to write opinions, judges on the
Courts of Appeals will hear more than 300 cases every year of
varying degrees of importance and interest, and will write more
than 30 or 40 opinions every year usually assigned to them by
senior judges on their panels.
It is especially difficult to assess the legacy of Judge Altimari,
because his philosophical and judicial temperament was such that
he never intended to even create a legacy. He was a "judge's
judge," a professional judge who wore the robe in state courts,
the federal district court, and the Second Circuit Court of Appeals
for almost 30 years, who had a deep understanding of the role of
the appellate courts. He looked upon judicial opinions as
resolutions of the disputes before him, not as opportunities to put
his individual stamp on the federal judiciary. He decided the case
that was before him, as he saw it, just as when he was sculpting
he would work with the stone before him, not try to create
something out of the stone that was not meant to be.
Thus, this essay's attempt to explain some of Judge Altimari's
noteworthy opinions in light of his judicial and personal
philosophies does something that the Judge would never have
done: look at his cases as extensions of himself. As such, we
think that the Judge would have been proud to think that the
philosophies with which he was imbued in his traditional "oldschool" education guided him in the exercise of his official
duties. We also think that the three cases we have highlighted

show Judge Altimari's greatest strengths as a judge: his
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overriding sense of fairness and justice, his belief in the rights of
the individual in the modem community, and his judicial
preference for prudence, pragmatism, and precedent in resolving
disputes.
Finally, we would be seriously remiss if we did not briefly
acknowledge our personal feelings for Judge Altimari, and how
enormously grateful we are for the opportunity we had to work at
his side for too brief a time. He was a man with an unbounded
capacity for love for his family, his friends, his colleagues, and
even his clerks, and we were blessed in our chance to share in
some small part of his life, to have him slip his arm in ours in his
familiar, affectionate way as we would walk to the courthouse, or
to see his welcoming smile when we would return to chambers
long after finishing our clerkships just to wish him well. He was
a wonderful man, and he will be missed.
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